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The paper develops a model in which a country with better technology for abatement of 
Green House Gas (GHG) emission (the North) commits to an international protocol to 
keep the global GHG emission within a specified limit while it helps the mitigation 
effort in the other country (the South) with unconditional transfer of abatement 
technology. It finds out in the autarkic (‘no trade’) equilibrium the technology transfer 
offer from the North is always accepted by the South. The North may offer either a 
partial or a complete technology transfer. If partial technology transfer is offered it finds 
out the determinants of the extent of technology transfer. Then it compares the autarkic 
equilibrium with equilibrium where trade with complete specialization occurs and finds 
out that trade limits the scope of technology transfer as an instrument for mitigation of 
global GHG emission. 
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1. Introduction 
               Keeping global pollution within the limit has recently been a major cause of 
concern around the world. Global pollution is a public ‘bad’, which adversely affects 
all the countries around the world through incidents like global climate change with 
grave implications for their economies. So, the countries have been deliberating 
among themselves for quite sometimes now on the way to reduce the global pollution 
to prevent global climate change. The Kyoto protocol had been a landmark agreement 
in this initiative. The Protocol sets distinct GHG emission targets and tries - by means 
of its flexible mechanisms - to distribute the burden of GHG emission mitigation 
more equitably and efficiently among countries. The countries in the North with the 
history of high emissions along with high national income and high rank in the 
Human Development Index (HDI) are slated to make commitments to stabilize the 
global pollution at a particular level. The North can fulfil its commitment either by 
controlling its own emission level or by helping mitigation in the South. It is argued 
that transfers from the North to the South, which target mitigation serves the objective 
of equity as the transfer flows from the rich countries to the poor countries. It also 
serves the objective of efficiency. Since the south possesses relatively inefficient 
technology for abatement and the North is already in possession of a better 
technology for abatement, the North can abate relatively less on its own without 
sacrificing its production by exploiting cheaper abatement options in the South
2. The 
Climate Convention also stresses on transfer from the North to the South to help the 
South to adapt with the reality of climate change. As a part of the adaptation funding,
3 
a significant amount has already been spent in countries like India and China to make 
them aware of the danger of climate change. Consequently, though the countries in 
the South did not make any formal commitment in Kyoto, they have also joined the 
global effort in the GHG emission reduction by design of suitable regulations to 
control GHG emission and by formation of institutions like Pollution Control Boards.  
                                                 
2 See GTZ (2004) for details. For a theoretical model explaining the transfers with the objectives of equity 
and efficiency see Caplan, Cornes and Silva (2003). 
3 Here we refer to adaptation of climate friendly technologies to mitigate climate change. We therefore do 
not refer to adaptation to ongoing climate change. 
  3                       Transfers from the North to the South play a major role in the global 
effort in GHG emission reduction. Transfers can take different forms: it can either be 
a financial transfer or a technology transfer. Schelling (1991) proposed a carbon tax 
in the North to finance abatement activities in the South. However, in this paper we 
focus on the issue of technology transfer, which in recent times became an important 
part of the international agreements defining the role of the North in the abatement 
effort in the South. Technology transfer from the North to the South played an 
important role in the talk about Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) as a part of 
Kyoto protocol. It also played an important role in the recent Asia-Pacific Partnership 
on Clean Development and Climate
4 signed by Australia, China, India, Japan, 
Republic of Korea and the United States in 2005. In this paper we focus on the role of 
technology transfer for abatement purpose in the reduction of GHG emission. 
Specifically, we explore the determinants of the extent of technology transfer where 
the North makes a commitment to stabilize the global GHG emission to a limit and 
South does not make any such explicit commitment. Then, we also ask the question if 
the trade in commodities restricts the role of technology transfer. 
                        We  construct  a  theoretical  framework  in  this  paper  where  first  we 
consider the no-trade (“autarkic”) situation and then we consider the trade in 
commodities, in which the country with better abatement technology (the North) 
specializes in production of the non-polluting commodity and the other country (the 
South) specializes in the production of the polluting commodity. We find in trade 
situation, there is a possibility that the North refuses to transfer its better technology 
at all as it fears an increase in global GHG emission as a result of the transfer. 
However, if it decides to transfer, it transfers the complete technology. This is unlike 
the autarkic situation in which it is always inclined to transfer the technology. 
However, in autarky it may decide to transfer only a part of its technology or an old 
                                                 
4 On 28 July 2005 Australia, China, India, Japan, Republic of Korea and the United States announced the 
Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate at an Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) Regional Forum meeting. The Partnership was finally launched on January 12 2006 at the 
Partnership's inaugural Ministerial meeting in Sydney. The ministers agreed on a Charter, Communique 
and Work Plan that outline a new model to address climate change, energy security and air pollution. The 
members of this partnership account for more than 50% of the world's greenhouse gas emissions. Unlike 
the Kyoto Protocol, this agreement allows member countries to set their goals for reducing emissions 
individually, with no mandatory enforcement mechanism.  
  4 vintage of its stock of technologies. We find the determinants of equilibrium extent of 
technology transfer from the North. In trade situation, the South that always accepts 
the transfer offer in the autarkic situation may refuse to accept the offer. We argue 
this happens because it suffers from the adverse ‘terms of trade’ effect due to 
technology transfer. We find the precise condition under which the technology 
transfer takes place in trade situation. Here we observe that the commodity trade not 
only restricts the scope of technology transfer but also makes the fulfilment of the aim 
of stabilizing the global emission level uncertain even if the complete technology is 
transferred to the South. 
                       The scope of this paper is somewhat unique in the literature and the 
results provide new insights. It deals with the issue of technology transfer and trade 
when the North commits to a defined limit of the global GHG emission and 
characterizes the equilibrium. There are some papers in the literature like Stranlund 
(1996), Scheffran and Pickl (2000) that deal with the issue of technology transfer 
from the North to the South, but they do not consider the commitment on the part of 
the North in keeping the GHG emission within a limit. They do not discuss the 
commodity trade equilibrium either. The paper by Yang (1999) is very close to our 
framework. Although it considers the mitigation effect of the technology transfer in 
the South, as it ignores the adaptation exercise in the South, it ignores an important 
effect generated by the transfer of abatement technology in the South i.e. the 
expansion of the polluting industry. This affects the results of the paper. We correct 
for this omission in our paper. Yang (1999) also does not consider the trade situation. 
There are papers in the trade theory which deal with trade and environment
5.
 
Copeland and Taylor (2005) analyze in a trading world the effects of commitment on 
the part of the North on global pollution level. It also discusses the effects of the 
pollution permit trading among the countries in the North on the same. It shows the 
conventional wisdom that existed in the context of the autarkic equilibrium change 
considerably as the possibility of trade is taken into account.  But, though it considers 
trade flows between the countries, it does not consider any kind of transfer from the 
North to South as we do in this paper.  Another set of papers in the literature restrict 
                                                 
5 See Copeland and Taylor (2004) for a recent review. 
  5 themselves to the issue of technology transfer and trade; they do not deal with the 
issue of GHG emission. In particular, Beladi, Jones and Marjit (1997) use a very 
similar model as we develop in this paper. However, they find no conflict between 
technology transfer and commodity trade. In contrast to them, in our paper as we take 
into account the issue of the GHG emission we find out trade may restrict the scope 
of technology transfer. Therefore, this paper explores a new area in economic 
research and also makes important contribution in terms of the results it generates.         
                   In the next section of the paper we lay out the model. The two subsections 
in it consider the “autarkic” and “trade” situations. The section following concludes. 
 
  




We consider two countries the North and the South. The North is denoted as the i
th 
country and the South is denoted as the j
th country. Both the countries have labor as 
their only factor of production. The endowments of labor in the North and the South 
are identical, given by L. The countries produce and consume two commodities 1 and 
2, the amounts of which are denoted by q1 and q2. The commodity 1 does not have 
any pollution component associated with its production. However, commodity 2 is an 
“impure public good” that emits CO2 in the production process that adversely affects 
global climate. In particular we assume 1 unit production of commodity 2 emits one 
unit of CO2. The global climate change has a negative impact on the enjoyment of 
private utility (from the consumption of the commodities) in each of these countries. 
Therefore, each country tries to abate the pollution generated in her. But, the 
abatement technology has a limitation. It can abate only ψ fraction of the 1 unit of 
CO2 emitted in the production process. Therefore, it emits φ = 1 - ψ units of CO2 per 
unit of production of commodity 2. 
  6 The countries differ in terms of their abatement technologies in the following way. 
Suppose, the amount of labor required to abate ψ units of CO2 is given by
6 aψ. We 
assume the North possesses more efficient technology for abatement than the South in 
the sense that ψi > ψj and aψiψi < aψjψj. The fractions, φi and φj denote per unit 
emissions from the countries.  
The countries have identical preferences. The utility function of the North is given by: 
vi = u(q1i, q2i) - 
2
1
 (φi q2i + φj q2j)
2                                                                             (1) 
and the utility function of the South is given by: 
vj = u(q1j, q2j) - 
2
1
 (φi q2i + φj q2j)
2                                                                             (2) 
where u1 > 0, u2 - (φi q2i + φj q2j) φi > 0, u2 - (φi q2i + φj q2j) φj > 0, u11 < 0, u22 < 0, u12 
= u21 = 0.  
The countries have C.R.S technology in production of both the commodities. The 
production of 1 unit of commodity 1 in the North and the South requires respectively 
a1i and a1j units of labor. Similarly, the production of commodity 2 in them requires 
respectively a2i and a2j units of labor. We assume, a1i < a1j and a2i < a2j so that the 
North has absolute advantage in production of both the commodities. Since the 
countries internalize a part of the pollution cost associated with the production of 
commodity 2 through the costly abatement activity, its actual labor cost of production 
in the North and the South turns out to be
7 (a2i + aψiψi) and (a2j + aψjψj) respectively. 
Therefore, the production possibility frontier of the North can be written as: 
L = a1i q1i + (a2i + aψiψi) q2i.                                                                                                                                     (3)                                
Similarly, the production possibility frontier of the South can be written as: 
L = a1j q1j + (a2j + aψjψj) q2j.                                                                                         (4)                                               
                                                 
6 Such numbers reflect a mixture of technical knowledge (blueprints), climate and labor skills. In the 
question of technology transfer we consider reasonably only the transfer of the blueprint as in Beladi, Jones 
and Marjit (1997).   
7 In our model we assume aψi and aψj as parameters. The governments in individual countries being aware 
of the danger of GHG emission try their best to internalize the social cost of the emission from their own 
countries. There are papers in the literature, which treat them as strategic variables with the countries. See 
for examples the papers by Barrett (1994). 
  7 We also assume, the South has comparative advantage in production of commodity 2, 
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1 .                                                                                         (5)                               
Observe, the countries have strategic interdependence in their choice of q2i and q2j. So 
it must be the case that at least a Nash equilibrium exists in this game. Suppose, the 
unique Nash equilibrium of the game is given by (q2i* > 0, q2j* > 0). Then it must 
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2 ψ ψ +
+ u2 = (φi q2i + φj q2j) φj.                                                                    (7) 
While equation (6) represents the reaction function of the North, equation (7) 
represents the reaction function of the South. The equilibrium consumption of 
commodity 1 in the two countries q1i* and q1j* are determined from equations (3) and 
(4) as q1i* = 
i
i i i i
a
q a a L
1
2 2 * ) ( ψ ψ + −
 and q1j* = 
j
j j j j
a
q a a L
1
2 2 * ) ( ψ ψ + −
. We also check 
that at (q2i* > 0, q2j* > 0) the second order condition for utility maximization is 
satisfied for each of the countries. The stability condition for the Nash equilibrium is 
also satisfied. The global pollution level at the Nash equilibrium is given by: 
R = φi q2i* + φj q2j*.                                                                                                    (8) 
Observe, at the equilibrium q2i* > q2j*. This must be true because owing to the 
assumption φi < φj the marginal cost of production of q2i in the North which is given 
by (φi q2i + φj q2j) φi is strictly less than the marginal cost of production of q2j in the 
South given by (φi q2i + φj q2j) φj. 
Now, suppose the North with its better technology of abatement commits to an 
international agreement by which it contemplates transferring its technology for 
abatement to the South in order to restrict the global pollution level within the current 
limit. The South, which receives the technology, does not commit to any output 
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 implies ‘no technology 
transfer’ (as the South’s technology remains unchanged at ψj) and γ* = 1 implies 
‘complete technology transfer’ (as the South’s technology changes to ψi) while γ*ψi 
represents a general case. We also assume, the technology is transferred free of cost. 
However, as the better abatement technology is transferred from the North to the 
South, the South’s reaction to the North’s pollution level changes that results in a 
change in the initial Nash equilibrium. The global pollution level also changes. Then, 
in this situation the North’s commitment to the abovementioned international protocol 
would imply, it would choose its output level in such a way that at the new 
equilibrium (q2i′, q2j′) the following constraint holds: 
φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′ ≤ R .                                                                                         (9)                               
As the North commits to technology transfer as well as to the above-mentioned 
international protocol the nature of the game played between the countries takes the 
form given below: 
 
t =1                                                            t = 2 
 
The North chooses                   The South observes (q2i′, γ*)                      Payoffs  
     (q2i′, γ*)                                     and chooses q2j′                              are realized.                                      
Observe, in this situation q2j′ depends on the choice of (q2i′, γ*) by the North. On the 
other hand the choice of (q2i′, γ*) depends on the way it affects q2j′. We solve the 
game applying the method of backward induction. So, we first look at the reaction of 
the South to the change in the values of q2i′ and γ*. 
  9 
                                                 
8 If the abatement technology was indivisible, the higher value of γ would imply more updated vintage of 







2  = 0. (ii) If φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) 
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′ ∂ j q
 > 0. 
Proof: See the appendix. 
The North internalizes the behavior of the South as given by lemma 1 and 2 in its 
choice of (q1i′, q2i′, γ*). The North solves the following problem: it maximizes,  
vi = u(q1i, q2i) - 
2
1
 (φi q2i + (1 - γψi) q2j)
2                                                                  (10)           
by choosing  (q1i′, q2i′, γ*) subject to the constraints given by equation (3), inequality 
(9),  and the lemmas 1 and 2. Substituting q1i′ from equation (3) into equation (10) the 
problem can be rewritten as: maximization of 
vi = u(
i
i i i i
a
q a a L
1
2 2 ) ( ψ ψ + −
, q2i) - 
2
1
 (φi q2i + (1 - γψi) q2j)
2                                    (11) 
by the choice of (q2i′ > 0, γ* > 0) subject to the constraints: 
φi q2i + (1 - γψi) q2j ≤ R                                                                   (as in inequality (9)) 
γ ≤ 1                                                                                                                          (12) 





                                                                                                                 (13) 
and the behavior of the South given by lemmas 1 and 2. The equilibrium choice of γ* 
by the North and the global pollution level at the equilibrium are characterized by the 








. Note, ε > 0 by virtue of 
lemma 2. Then, the proposition is stated as: 
  10 Proposition 1: The following situations are possible at the equilibrium: (i) the North 
offers partial technology transfer when γ* = 
) 1 ( ε ψ
ε
+ i
 and φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′ ≤ 






 and φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) 
q2j′ < R.  
Proof: See the appendix. 
As the North transfers the better technology of abatement to the South, the source of 
its benefit lies in the consequent reduction of the global pollution level. If the South 
receives the better technology its cost of abatement (and therefore the cost of 
production) falls. As a result the production of the polluting commodity in the South 
rises. Because of this, a possibility occurs such that the global pollution level 
increases as a whole with a threat of reducing welfare of country i, which has 
originally transferred the technology. However, if γ* = 
) 1 ( ε ψ
ε
+ i
, even if its 
production of the polluting commodity rises the South’s contribution to the global 
pollution level remains unchanged. In this situation, depending on its preference for 
commodity 2 the North either can choose its output in such a way that the global 
pollution falls below the limit R , which is the current pollution level or it can choose 






, as the 
technology is transferred the South emits more pollution in the air so that the global 
pollution level rises. Therefore, the North not only transfers its complete abatement 
technology but also reduces its own output of the polluting commodity to such an 
extent that the global pollution at the equilibrium falls below the limitR .  
In the next proposition we calculate the determinants of extent of technology transfer 
in the case of partial technology transfer is offered.  
Proposition 2: If the North offers partial technology transfer, as ψi rises the extent of 
technology transfer falls. As ε rises the extent of technology transfer rises. 
Proof: See the appendix. 
  11 As we have argued above when the North offers partial technology transfer γ* = 
) 1 ( ε ψ
ε
+ i
 the pollution emitted by the South remains constant as the technology is 
transferred. To maintain this feature of the equilibrium it is necessary for the North to 
reduce the extent of technology transfer at the equilibrium if it possesses a better 
technology at the initial situation. In other words, if the North possesses a better 
abatement technology it is sufficient for it to transfer a smaller part of it to keep the 
pollution emitted by the South unchanged at the initial level. If the South has higher ε 
that implies if the technology is transferred to it to some extent, its output of the 
polluting commodity rises by a higher extent. As a result given the initial technology 
level of the country it adds more to the global pollution level. To counter this 
possibility and to keep the emission of the South fixed at the initial level, proposition 
2 states, the North must transfer higher proportion of its better technology to the 
South. 
It can also be argued that the South always accepts the technology transfer offer from 
the North. We note this as a separate proposition of the model as: 
Proposition 3: Whenever the South receives a technology transfer offer from the 
North it accepts the offer. 
Proof: See the appendix. 
As the technology transfer is offered by the North, the South gains on two counts. 
First, as proposition 1 suggests, the global pollution level either falls or remains the 
same. Second, as the better abatement technology is transferred it produces more of 
the polluting commodity (from lemma 2). Since, as we assume in this paper there is a 
net gain in utility associated with production of commodity 2, the overall utility level 
of the country rises at the equilibrium. Therefore, proposition 1 and 3 together 
suggest whenever the North offers a technology transfer, the South readily accepts it. 
                                                                                                                                                              
Now, we consider the cases where at the initial equilibrium trade is opened up 
between the countries. 
 
 
  12 2.2    Trade: Complete specialization  
 
We consider the countries are small enough and competitive in the world commodity 
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1 . Since the North has comparative advantage in 
production of commodity 1 and the South has comparative advantage in commodity 2 
(see the assumption in equation (5) above), as in the Ricardian models of trade, 
country 1 completely specializes in production of commodity 1 and country 2 
completely specializes in production of commodity 2. It follows from equations (3) 




,  i q2 = 0) and the South 
produces ( j q1 = 0,  j 2 q = 
j j j a a
L
ψ ψ + 2
). However, both the countries consume both the 
commodities at the international prices p1 and p2. Suppose, ( , ) represent the 












.                                                                                                      (14) 
Similarly, the consumption equilibrium at the South, ( , ) must satisfy the 






~ + p  = p j q2
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j j j a a
L
ψ ψ + 2
.                                                                                      (15) 
We assume both the commodities are normal commodities in terms of their 
consumption. It follows: 
dp
q d i 2
~
 < 0 and 
dp
q d j 2
~
 < 0. As the trade opens up and both 
countries gain in terms of real income, it must also be true that   > q i q2
~





  13 The world market for commodity 2 must satisfy the following market clearing 
condition: 
i q2
~ (p) +  (p) =  j q2
~
j j j a a
L
ψ ψ + 2
                                                                                 (16) 
which determines the international terms of trade p. 
Since, now only the South produces the commodity emitting CO2 in its production the 
global pollution level is given by:  
R = φj  j q2 .                                                                                                                 (17) 
How does R compare with R ? 
Lemma 3: R > R . 
Proof: Since  j q2 = 
j j j a a
L
ψ ψ + 2
, using equation (16) into equation (17) we have: 




Since   > q i q2
~
2i*,   > q j q2
~
2j* and  φi < φj the following must be true: 




i q2i* + φj q2j*.  
Therefore, from equations (8) and (18) the statement of the lemma follows.                 
Since, now the North does not produce the polluting commodity, the commitment of 
the North to the international protocol to keep the global pollution level within 
R translates into the North’s commitment to transfer the better abatement technology 
in such a way that the global pollution level remains within the limit. Now, the North 
chooses γ in an attempt to implement the following condition: 
(1 - γψi)  j q2 ≤ R .                                                                                                      (19) 
Observe, since with trade and therefore unlike in the autarkic situation the North no 
longer produces the polluting commodity now it has only one instrument i.e. the 
choice of γ to implement the global pollution commitment given by equation (19). 
Here we are interested to know the choice of γ by the North. But, since it commits to 
satisfy equation (19) before making its choice it would like to know the way the 
South would like to react to its choice of γ. We denote the choice of γ by the North 
asγ . Unlike the autarkic situation here, as γ  changes the international terms of trade  ~ ~
  14 p changes. We call this ‘terms-of-trade’ effect. While taking its decision about ofγ , 







 < 0. 
Proof: As the technology transfer takes place equation (16) can be written as: 
i q2





.                                                                                     (20) 
From equation (15): 
γ ~ d
dp
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d j  < 0 and the commodities are the normal commodities,   





q d j > 0. 
Proof:  We know,  with trade  j q2 = 
j j j a a
L
ψ ψ + 2
. With technology transfer 
j q2 becomes: 
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d j  > 0.                                                       
Now, in view of the three lemmas derived above we look at the choice of γ  by the 
North. We also derive the condition under which the technology transfer offer is 
accepted by the South. We state the results in the following proposition of the model. 
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, the North offers complete 
technology transfer (chooses   = 1) and the South accepts it.   γ ~
Proof:  
Observe, compared to the autarkic situation now there is a possibility that the North 
refrains from technology transfer to the South. It does so if it contemplates that 
technology transfer is going to raise the global pollution level further. However, if it 
decides to transfer the technology at all, it opts for complete technology transfer. In 
the autarkic situation there is a possibility that the North goes for partial technology 
transfer, which vanishes with the trade situation. In the autarkic situation the South 
used to always gain from the technology transfer. So, whenever there was a 
technology transfer offer from the North, the South used to accept it. With trade this 
result changes. Now although the South benefits with the technology transfer as its 
production expands and the global pollution falls, but it loses as the international 
terms of trade moves against it. If ε is too low the ‘terms of trade’ effect dominates 
the other beneficial effects. Therefore, it refrains from accepting the technology 
transfer offer. Also observe, since in trade situation the North has one instrument less 
to commit to the global pollution constraint compared to the autarkic situation (it can 
choose only the extent of technology transfer, not the output of the polluting 
commodity), with trade there is no guarantee that the technology transfer can achieve 
the global pollution constraint given by equation (19). Unlike in the autarkic situation, 




  16 3. Conclusions 
                 The paper develops a model that tries to capture the possible impact of 
technology transfer in the purview of international agreements like Kyoto and Asia-
Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate on global climate change in 
which the North, the country with better abatement technology transfers its 
technology to the South such that the global GHG emission stabilizes within a 
defined limit. The paper considers both the no-trade (“autarkic”) situation and the 
trade situation between the North and the South. It finds out in the autarkic situation 
even if the better abatement technology is transferred free of cost, at the equilibrium, 
the North will always like to transfer its technology to the South. However, the 
technology transfer can be either partial or complete. The South is always better off 
accepting the technology. The global pollution level always remains within the 
initially agreed limit. Next it introduces the possibility of trade in commodities 
between these countries and finds out the outcomes are different from the autarkic 
equilibrium. Because of trade, complete specialization in production occurs in both 
countries: the North completely specializes in production of the non-polluting 
commodity while the South specializes in the polluting commodity. In such a 
situation it becomes obvious that there is a possibility that the North is better off by 
not transferring its technology at all. However, if it decides to transfer the technology 
it transfers it completely. The partial transfer does not occur at the equilibrium. 
However, as the international terms of trade moves against the South, which receives 
the technology sometimes it is better off by refusing the transfer offer. The 
technology transfer in this case also cannot ensure the maintenance of the global 
pollution level within the initially agreed limit. Here we observe that the commodity 
trade not only restricts the scope of technology transfer but also makes the fulfilment 
of the aim of stabilizing the global emission level uncertain even if the complete 
technology is transferred to the South.  
                       The model is based on a number of assumptions. It builds up on a 
carefully crafted example, which brings out the contrasting results in the autarkic and 
trade equilibria. Some of the assumptions we feel are realistic. Some of them are 
limiting, if relaxed offer possibilities of new research.  
  17                         In this model we assume the country with better abatement technology 
also has a better production technology. The better abatement technology is not only 
able to abate more but also operates at lower cost. We think this assumption is 
realistic. The model also assumes a particular pattern of comparative advantage 
between the countries, which we again feel is realistic. The trade is modelled as a 
Ricardian model because that best captures the issue of technology transfer. 
Therefore, it uses only one factor of production, which is immobile between the 
countries. So, it fails to capture the effect of factor mobility between the countries on 
the equilibrium. The assumption of complete specialization in production is another 
limiting assumption of the model. If we allow for incomplete specialization in the 
country with better technology it is possible that the trade equilibrium can yield 
similar features as the autarkic equilibrium. In the model, we have assumed the 
technology transfer is free. Relaxing the assumption of free technology transfer eases 
the burden of fulfilling the commitment on the North, but it accentuates the 
possibility that there is no agreement between the countries on technology transfer 
and the effort to limit the global pollution suffers a setback. In this paper we have 
assumed the technology transfer takes place in a traded commodity. A possible 
extension of the paper can be introduction of a non-traded commodity (like power) in 
this model when the technology is transferred in this non-traded industry. However, 
our guess is that this new possibility, though interesting, is expected to yield similar 
results as in the current paper. Another interesting extension of this paper would be 
the introduction of strategic trade instead of the trade based on perfect competition. 
Here, we have not discussed if the transfer of abatement technology is the optimum 
strategy available for countries with better technology to keep the global pollution 
level within the limit. There could be other options like a transfer of the production 
technology or a combination of the abatement and the production technologies. We 
have not explored the possible answer to this question in this paper.   
                    So,  the  paper  brings  out  many  interesting  possibilities  of  research. 
Checking for these unexplored possibilities remain as our future research agenda.  
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Appendix 
Proof of lemma 1. If φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′ = R , at (q1j′, q2j′) the objective function of 
the South as given in equation (2) can be written as: 
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where βj is the new labor requirement in the South for the amount of abatement 




d j  < 
0. Substituting the value of q1j′ from equation (11) into equation (10) and maximizing 









+ u2 = 0.                                                                                                (3a) 







2  = 0. Therefore, the first part of the 
statement of the lemma follows. 
If φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′ < R , at (q1j′, q2j′) the objective function of the South as given 
in equation (2) can be written as: 
vj = u(q1j′, q2j′) - 
2
1
(φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′)
2 .                                                           (4a) 
Substituting q1j′ from equation (2a) into equation (4a) and maximizing with respect to 








+ u2 =  (φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′) (1 - γ*ψi).                                            (5a) 
From (5a) we find: 
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By the assumptions of the model γ*ψi < 1. The second order condition of 








2  < 0.  Hence the statement of the second part of the lemma follows.                                           
Proof of lemma 2. If φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′ = R , at (q1j′, q2j′) the objective function of 
the South as given in equation (1a). The objective function can be rewritten using 
equation (2a), which is maximized at q2j′ > 0. The first order condition given by 
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d j  < 
0 and u11 < 0. The denominator is also negative by the second order condition of 




′ ∂ j q
 > 0. 
If φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′ < R , at (q1j′, q2j′) the objective function of the South as given 
in equation (4a). Substituting q1j′ from equation (2a) into equation (4a) and 
maximizing with respect to q2j′, we find q2j′ > 0 must satisfy the first order condition 
for maximization given by (5a). 












2 2 11 2 1 2
1
) * 1 ( ) (
























′ − − − ′ + −
                  (8a) 
  20 where, R = φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′. Given the assumptions of the model, it follows 




′ ∂ j q
 > 0. Hence we prove the statement of the lemma.              
Proof of Proposition 1. Given the North’s problem described above we can write the 
corresponding Lagrange function for optimization as: 
Z = u (
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i i i i
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1
 (φi q2i + (1 - γψi) q2j)
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 + γ)          (9a) 
which is maximized with respect to (q2i′ > 0, γ* > 0, λ1* ≥ 0, λ2* ≥ 0 , λ3* ≥ 0) where 
λ1, λ2 and λ3 are Lagrange multipliers. 
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  21 Case 1: We assume, 
1 λ ∂
∂Z
> 0 i.e. R  > φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′ from equation (11a); 
2 λ ∂
∂Z
 > 0 and 
3 λ ∂
∂Z





, 1) from equations (13a) and (14a). 
Then, complementary slackness implies it must be the case that λ1* = λ2* = λ3* = 0. 
This implies from equations (10a) and (11a) at  (q2i′ > 0, γ* > 0) the following 







2 ψ ψ +











) * 1 (
γ









- ε) (φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′ ) = 0.                                   (15a)  








- ε = 0, which 
in turn implies at the equilibrium it must be true that: γ* = 




Case 2: We assume, 
1 λ ∂
∂Z
= 0 i.e. R  = φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′ from equation (11a); 
2 λ ∂
∂Z
 > 0 and 
3 λ ∂
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, 1) from equations (13a) and (14a). 
Then, complementary slackness implies it must be the case that λ1* > 0 and λ2* = λ3* 
= 0. 
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- ε) (φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′ + λ1*) = 0.                          (16a)     
Equation (16a) is true for γ* = 




We check at (q2i′ > 0, γ* > 0) the constraint qualification condition: φi dq2i ≤ 0 also 
holds. 
Case 3: We assume, 
1 λ ∂
∂Z
= 0 i.e. R  = φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′ from equation (11a); 
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 = 0 and 
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 < γ* = 1 from equations (13a) and (14a). 
Then, complementary slackness implies it must be the case that λ1* > 0 and λ2* > 0 
and λ3* = 0. 
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> ε. Since in this case γ* = 1, the condition turns 







Here, the conditions for constraint qualifications are: 






) dγ ≤ 0 and dγ ≤ 0, which are not satisfied at (q2j′ > 0, 
γ* = 1). Therefore, this case does not offer a solution to the North’s maximization 
problem. 
  23 Case 4: We assume, 
1 λ ∂
∂Z
= 0 i.e. R  = φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′ from equation (11a); 
2 λ ∂
∂Z
 > 0 and 
3 λ ∂
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 = γ* < 1 from equations (13a) and (14a). 
Then, complementary slackness implies it must be the case that λ1* > 0 and λ2* = 0 
and λ3* > 0. 
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Here, the conditions for constraint qualifications are: 












). Therefore, this case does not offer a solution to the North’s maximization 
problem. 
Case 5: We assume, 
1 λ ∂
∂Z
 > 0 i.e. R  > φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′ from equation (11a); 
2 λ ∂
∂Z
 = 0 and 
3 λ ∂
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 < γ* = 1 from equations (13a) and (14a). 
  24 Then, complementary slackness implies it must be the case that λ1* = 0 and λ2* > 0 
and λ3* = 0. 
This implies from equations (10a) and (11a) at  (q2i′ > 0, γ* > 0) the following 
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> ε. Since in this case γ* = 1, the condition turns 







Here, the condition for constraint qualification is: dγ ≤ 0, which holds at (q2j′ > 0, γ* = 
1).  
Case 6: We assume, 
1 λ ∂
∂Z
 > 0 i.e. R  > φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′ from equation (11a); 
2 λ ∂
∂Z
 > 0 and 
3 λ ∂
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 = γ* < 1 from equations (13a) and (14a). 
Then, complementary slackness implies it must be the case that λ1* = λ2*  = 0 and 
λ3* > 0. 
This implies from equations (10a) and (11a) at  (q2i′ > 0, γ* > 0) the following 







2 ψ ψ +











) * 1 (
γ









- ε) (φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′) + λ3* = 0.                          (20a) 
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Here, the condition for constraint qualification is: dγ ≤ 0. But, it does not hold at (q2j′ 






Hence, the statement of the proposition follows.                                                            
Proof of Proposition 2. From proposition 1, if the North offers partial technology 
transfer the extent of technology transfer at the equilibrium is given by γ* = 
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> 0 since ψi > 0. Hence, the statement of the proposition follows.                                 
Proof of Proposition 3.  From proposition 1 the following situations may occur at the 
equilibrium: (i) the North offers partial technology transfer when γ* = 










  and φi q2i′ + (1 - γ*ψi) q2j′ < R . 
If situation (i) occurs as the better abatement technology is offered the global 
pollution level either remains the same or falls. Therefore, it follows from equation 
(2), the South’s utility either remains the same or improves from the pollution effect. 
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  26 < 0. Similar arguments can be made if situation (ii) occurs at the equilibrium. 
Therefore, the South always accepts the offer for technology transfer.                        
Proof of Proposition 4. As the North transfers the technology to the South, the global 
pollution level becomes:  
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Since lemma 5 implies ε > 0 it follows from equation (21a) 
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 since the North commits to constraint (19) it refrains from 





 is chosen). However, from equation (21a) 
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On the other hand, 
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Since (- pu1 + u2) = 0 from equation (22a), 
γ d
dp
 < 0 from lemma 3 and 
γ d
dR
 < 0. 
Therefore, it is always γ* = 1.  
However, the South accepts the technology transfer offer if 
γ d
dv j  > 0. With 












2 subject to the budget constraint given by equation (15):  
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From the budget equation substituting  = p( j q1
~
j q2 - ) into the objective function, 
we solve for the North’s problem with respect to q , which satisfies the following 
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From equation (25a): 
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Therefore, the statement of the proposition follows.                                                                   
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